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MOBILE HEALTH SYSTEMS AND EMERGENCE
Changes in the age distribution of the population and increased prevalence 
of chronic illnesses, together with a shortage of health professionals and 
other resources, will increasingly challenge the ability of national healthcare 
systems to meet rising demand for services. Large-scale use of eHealth 
and mHealth services enabled by advances in ICT are frequently cited as 
providing part of the solution to this crisis in future provision. As part of this 
picture, self-monitoring and remote monitoring of patients, for example by 
means of smartphone apps and body-worn sensors, is on the way to becoming 
mainstream. In future, each individual’s personal health system may be able 
to access a large number of devices, including sensors embedded in the 
environment as well as in-body smart medical implants, in order to provide 
(semi-)autonomous health-related services to the user. This article presents 
some examples of mHealth systems based on emerging technologies, including 
body area networks (BANs), wireless and mobile technologies, miniature body-
worn sensors and distributed decision support. Applications are described in 
the areas of management of chronic illnesses and management of (large-scale) 
emergency situations. In the latter setting BANs form part of an advanced ICT 
system proposed for future major incident management; including BANs for 
monitoring casualties and emergency services personnel during first response. 
Some challenges and possibilities arising from current and future emerging 
mHealth technologies, and the question of how emergence theory might have 
a bearing on understanding these challenges, is discussed here.
Introduction
Mobile health (mHealth) systems are electronic health (eHealth) systems which utilise mobile technologies to provide mobile health-related services to users. At the University 
of Twente we apply the emergent technologies of body area networks (BANs), wearable sensors 
and wireless communications in the healthcare domain in order to provide mHealth services to 
patients and professionals.
Body Area Networks
We define a BAN as a ‘network of communicating devices worn on, in or around the body providing mobile services to the wearer’, thus including the possibility of implanted devices 
as well as body-worn devices and devices carried by users (e.g. in a pocket) or worn as part 
of ‘body furniture’ (e.g. jewellery or spectacles). A mobile platform such as a personal digital 
assistant (PDA) or smartphone handles storage, processing and communications. This generic 
concept of BAN can be specialised for particular application domains; we focus on BANs to 
support healthcare, referring to this class as health BANs. Health BANs can provide local 
mobile health services such as patient monitoring, (bio)feedback, coaching and even treatment. 
These BANs may include medical devices such as biosensors as well as general purpose devices 
(e.g. alarm buttons). A health BAN then might consist of a smartphone and a set of body-worn 
sensors which measure the patient’s biosignals (blood pressure, heart rate and blood glucose, 
for example). Sensor data may be processed locally on the BAN or sent to a remote system for 
processing, or a combination of the two.
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Where communication with a remote system is involved, for instance transmission of biosignals 
to a hospital or to a (mobile) professional, the mHealth services can be designated teleservices 
(examples are telemedicine services such as telemonitoring and teletreatment). An early example 
we proposed of teletreatment mediated by a BAN was the possibility of applying a feedback-
control loop so that a medication delivery device (e.g. implanted insulin pump) is controlled on 
the basis of ongoing monitoring of biosignals (e.g. blood glucose) (Jones et al., 2001). Several 
examples of applications of health BANs are described below, in order to illustrate the generic 
concepts and the range of possibilities for mHealth applications.
Body Area Networks in Chronic Care
From 2002 to 2004 during the IST project MobiHealth (http://www.mobihealth.org) the health BAN concept was specialised for different clinical applications, and a number of 
health BANs prototyped and trialled with patients suffering from chronic conditions including 
cardiac arrhythmias, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and mental health problems. 
Additionally, a pregnancy monitoring BAN was developed; this example is used to illustrate 
the principles. The pregnancy monitoring trial was conducted with the collaboration of the 
gynaecology department at a hospital in the Netherlands, Medisch Spectrum Twente. The target 
group was women with high-risk pregnancies who would normally require in-hospital monitoring 
for a period of three days at a time. The pregnancy BAN had the following hardware configuration: 
the mobile platform was a PDA (IPAQ) and the BAN devices comprised five electrodes for 
measuring electromyography (EMG) and an alarm button. The objective was to detect premature 
labour or foetal distress from the EMG signals. For reasons of patient safety the trial group 
consisted of patients with normal pregnancies. The BAN was fitted by the gynaecologist and the 
patient was then able to be monitored from home or any other location, whilst following normal 
daily life activities, with biosignals and any alarm indications transmitted in real time from the 
BAN to the care team at the hospital over wireless cell phone communications (general packet 
radio service (GPRS) and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)).
This example illustrates the general concept of mobile monitoring by means of a health BAN; 
of course the exact hardware configuration and software application has to be designed and 
implemented based on the specific requirements of each clinical application. Variants of the 
BAN, using different sensor sets, were prototyped during the MobiHealth project, with nine 
different specialisations of the health BAN trialled on patient groups in four European countries. 
MobiHealth illustrated the feasibility and utility of transmitting biosignals wirelessly over 2.5 
and 3G. In later Dutch and European projects more advanced BAN applications for chronic 
disease management were developed, introducing teletreatment alongside telemonitoring and 
involving more and more sophisticated processing, analysis and interpretation of biosignals in 
the light of general and patient-specific clinical data and knowledge as well as various kinds of 
context data.
Further development of BANs for chronic disease management is currently conducted in 
the European project MobiGuide (http://www.mobiguide-project.eu). The MobiGuide patient 
guidance system supports the patient and the medical team caring for them in adhering to 
best evidence as encapsulated in clinical guidelines. Moreover, it supports communication 
between them, information sharing and shared decision-making between patient and clinician. 
The MobiGuide BAN is part of a distributed decision support system (DSS). The knowledge 
base of the distributed DSS is based on the knowledge encapsulated in clinical guidelines. 
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Clinical guidelines are documents which bring together the best and latest scientifically-proven 
knowledge about how to manage and treat a particular condition and as such represent current 
medical consensus. They are developed by panels of medical experts who review evidence from 
clinical trials and scientific literature in order to define best practice and support evidence-
based medicine.
Two patient groups are the especial focus in MobiGuide: pregnant women who develop diabetes 
during pregnancy (gestational diabetes mellitus or GDM) and patients suffering from a cardiac 
arrythmia (atrial fibrillation or AF). The AF application allows patients to manage their condition 
from home or while on the move under the guidance of clinical knowledge adapted to their 
individual treatment plan and situation. AF patients can record incidence and severity of 
symptoms on their smartphone and receive appropriate guideline-based but personalised advice 
from a distributed decision support system. The AF guideline, which is written in English, has 
been formalised to produce a computer interpretable version (a computer interpretable guideline 
or CIG). This CIG is customised to include social and technological context and forms the major 
part of the knowledge base in the decision support system. This CIG is then personalised for 
each individual patient by the cardiologist working together with the patient to decide which 
options suit their individual health condition and situation.
Measurements such as blood pressure, heart rate and ECG are uploaded automatically by 
the sensors of the MobiGuide BAN. Other measurements, such as weight, blood pressure, 
international normalised ratio (INR) values, dietary information and exercise can be entered 
manually by patients who can view their own data in a personal logbook running on their 
smartphone. AF patients can also use the system to monitor exercise sessions and receive 
warnings and advice, for instance when they exceed their personal recommended limits.
The GDM application allows the patient to enter her daily measurements and receive guidance 
from the system, which helps in her daily management of her blood glucose levels by means 
of diet, exercise and, in some cases, insulin therapy, according to the GDM guideline and her 
current treatment regimen and context. Functions include manual entry of insulin taken and 
ketone levels and manual or automatic entry of blood glucose and blood pressure readings, 
depending on whether the patient uses BlueTooth-enabled blood pressure and blood glucose 
sensors or not. MobiGuide is quality aware; when the patient enters an out-of-range value, for 
example, the system detects the error and displays a message querying the measurement and 
offering a second try at entering the value. As with the AF case, the patient can view their data 
in their personal logbook.
Behind these end-user applications there is a complex distributed system incorporating a 
distributed knowledge-based system. The BAN components comprise the mobile part of this 
distributed system. The MobiGuide BAN is based on the Samsung Galaxy S4 smartphone. 
The following sensors are used: the BioHarness 3 sensor belt from Zephyr, the Omron 708-BT 
blood pressure monitor, a glucometer for measuring blood glucose, plus two specially developed 
software detectors; one for detecting atrial fibrillation and another for measuring physical activity. 
When suitable sensors that can transfer data automatically become available and affordable, 
they can be integrated into the MobiGuide system, removing the need for manual entry and 
making the system easier for patients to use and less error prone.
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Body Area Networks in Emergency Care and Emergency Management
During the first health BAN project, MobiHealth, the team also developed and trialled two BANs for use in an acute setting: a trauma patient BAN, to be applied to casualties by 
ambulance paramedics for monitoring casualties in medical emergencies, and a BAN for health 
professionals, to be used by the ambulance paramedics attending the casualty. The trauma 
BANs, first proposed in Jones et al., 2001, were developed and trialled in collaboration with 
the Dutch ambulance service and traumatologists at a Dutch regional trauma centre, Medisch 
Spectrum Twente. Two BANs were prototyped and trialled: a trauma patient BAN and a BAN 
for paramedics. The trauma patient BAN included 4-channel ECG, a respiration sensor and a 
finger clip pulse oximeter. Other measurements (fluids, blood pressure and pupil reaction) were 
entered manually. The paramedic BAN enabled audio communications and transmission of 
images from the scene. The original intention was to include real-time video communications 
but in MobiHealth only still images were transmitted.
This emergency scenario was scaled up during 2004–6 in the IST project MOSAIC. The remit 
of MOSAIC, and the associated Ambient Intelligence At Work initiative of the EU, was not to 
develop technology but, firstly, to create futuristic visions of applications of future and emerging 
technologies which would enable ambient intelligence in the workplace; and, secondly, to 
develop roadmaps for future research and development towards implementation of these 
envisioned future applications. In this context a number of visions involving application of 
ambient intelligence was developed and analysed; one of these visions related to emergency 
management during the first response to a major incident. The vision was illustrated by a 
scenario – the MOSAIC Major Incident Scenario – together with an analysis of the future and 
emerging technologies that vision implied (Jones and Saranummi, 2010).
The MOSAIC Major Incident Scenario envisaged the large-scale use of advanced versions of 
the MobiHealth BANs in future emergency settings, namely the trauma patient BAN to support 
triage and monitoring of casualties, as well as use of professional BANS (future versions of the 
MobiHealth paramedic BAN) by emergency services personnel to support communications, 
tracking and health and wellbeing monitoring for personnel at the scene and to support 
telepresence and augmented reality experience of the scene for control-centre personnel up 
the command chain (Jones et al., 2005). In addition, we envisaged opportunistic construction 
of emergency communications networks where the BANS of the emergency services personnel 
and the vehicular networks of the emergency services vehicles could link together by ad hoc 
networking to construct an emergency communications network at the scene to plug gaps in 
local communications infrastructure damage (Jones et al., 2011).
The first response phase in major incident management was further researched, in collaboration 
with various partners in Durham, during a three-month IAS research fellowship in 2014. In 
particular, the state of the art of current ICT systems used by the fire service and police in 
Durham was investigated, and a preliminary analysis of requirements on specialised BANs for 
police and firefighters was conducted. This work complements the previous research conducted 
in collaboration with trauma surgeons, paramedics and hospital emergency departments during 
past projects on emergency management which focused on medical services.
5
Institute of Advanced Study Insights
Major Incident Management – Current Situation in the UK
In the first stage of a major emergency such as a natural disaster, major transportation accident or major terror attack, multiple casualties as well as massive damage to infrastructure may 
be involved and a coordinated response by the emergency services and other first responders is 
required.
First response refers to the phase where action is taken to address the immediate problems 
faced in an emergency situation, including rescue and treatment of casualties and managing 
the situation on the ground. Well-managed first response depends on prior phases involving risk 
analysis, planning and resilience and capacity building, and is followed by many other phases 
from ensuring business continuity through to reconstruction. Here we focus only on the first 
response phase.
During first response, each of the emergency services might require involvement by multiple 
teams from different regions (service ‘intraoperability’). Further, involvement of the different 
services (police, fire service, ambulance and possibly coastguard) and other first responders 
requires cross-service cooperation (service ‘interoperability’) (https://www.gov.uk /government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/5904/nationalframework.pdf) at operational, 
tactical, strategic levels. In some cases major incident management requires an international 
response and hence cross-border cooperation and coordination of first responders.
Analyses of major incidents from around the world (e.g. The 9/11 Commission Report; Zoraster, 
2006; Report of the 7 July Review Committee, 2007; Wood-Heath and Annis, 2004) show 
that communication and coordination and service intra- and interoperability continue to be 
persistent challenges in major incident and disaster management. Similar challenges are faced 
in the UK as demonstrated by the findings of the Pollock Review (Pollock, 2013) which also 
concludes that change is needed in the whole socio-technical context of disaster management. 
The UK government’s Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) is a 
response at national level to addressing the problem of service interoperability in the context 
of the provisions of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
2004/36/pdfs/ukpga_20040036_en.pdf). From the ICT perspective, organisational intra- and 
interoperability need to be supported by compatible and interoperable ICT systems which 
moreover are resilient in the face of infrastructure damage and possible cyber attack in rapidly 
evolving emergency situations.
In the UK and elsewhere the ICT systems, sensor networks and underlying network infrastructures 
have themselves become critical infrastructures supporting logistics, situation assessment, 
communications and information sharing in emergency management as well as in everyday life. 
However, these systems themselves have vulnerabilities and may malfunction, suffer damage or 
themselves be targets for (cyber) attack. As a result, in the very challenging and often rapidly 
evolving emergency situations, difficulties relating to communication and coordination may be 
exacerbated by accidental or deliberate disruption of communications.
In fact, the design, development and operation of the ICT systems so necessary to support 
command and control, situation assessment, communication and coordination and information 
sharing are themselves the source of many technical and non-technical challenges, some of 
which are general to (complex) ICT systems and some of which are especially relevant for safety 
critical systems in general and therefore to mHealth/eHealth systems and to systems supporting 
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emergency management. As with organisational interoperability, interoperability of ICT systems 
continues to be one of the major ICT-related technical challenges.
Some ICT Challenges and Issues Arising
There are many technical and socio-technical challenges arising out of recent developments in mHealth systems and the prospect of mass roll-out of mHealth services in emergency and 
routine situations. They include issues relating to:
•	 Correctness,	 safety	 and	 security:	 assurance	 of	 quality	 of	 software,	 systems	 and	 overall	
good behaviour (a prerequisite for patient and public safety) of distributed systems which 
increasingly rely on a plethora of autonomous intelligent components. Safety/security 
issues are even more critical in emergency settings and where teletreatment as well as 
telemonitoring is involved.
•		 Reliability	and	dependability:	resilience,	robustness.
•		 Interoperability,	scalability,	flexibility.	
•		 Usability:	natural	interfaces	(systems	must	assist	without	interfering	with	task(s)	in	hand);	
mobility (not tethered to vehicles), handsfree. 
•	 Ethical	 issues	 surrounding	 privacy,	 routine	 surveillance;	 public	 and	 private	 decisions	
regarding trade-offs between surveillance and control versus privacy and autonomy. 
•		 Determination	of	policy,	and	change	management,	 in	 relation	 to:	healthcare	organisation	
and delivery, professional culture and public acceptance, in the face of (r)evolution in the 
delivery of care enabled by advances in technology and driven by stakeholder interests 
including economic, demographic and political pressures. 
In the following section we concentrate on the first issue, namely of quality assurance of complex 
ICT systems.
Emergent Behaviour in Complex Distributed (ICT) Systems
In the foregoing, two connections with the themes of emergence have been alluded to: firstly, the use of emergent technologies (including BANs, wireless communications, miniature 
sensors, clinical decision support systems) to provide mobile health services to patients in 
chronic and acute settings; and, secondly, the use of these and other emergent technologies 
to support emergency management during first response to major incidents. At this point we 
introduce a third connection, namely the issue of emergent behaviour of complex (ICT) systems, 
which has implications relating to correctness and hence to reliability, dependability and safety 
of ICT systems including mHealth systems in chronic care and in emergency management. 
The challenges of quality assurance mentioned in the previous section are complicated by the 
possibility of complex ICT systems exhibiting emergent behaviour.
Some ICT systems are in fact designed, and intended to produce (or give the appearance of 
producing), some kind of emergent behaviour. For example, non-deterministic systems may be 
designed to produce different outcomes in the same situation (e.g. for reasons of fairness in a 
multi-user operating system) and neural networks and other AI systems may utilise heuristics 
or learning algorithms with the production of ‘emergent’ behaviour as the overt intention. Some 
such systems are provided with underlying, sometimes non-algorithmic, mechanisms which 
enable discovery, recognition or synthesis or production of (new) patterns or phenomena when 
supplied with sufficient and relevant sets of data and examples and some kind of mechanism or 
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engine for driving the process. In these cases ‘emergent’ behaviour is intended, expected and 
will usually be welcomed. It can be argued, however, that such systems are all deterministic at a 
certain level and hence in principle can be explained by reduction, providing we have the means 
to access all the relevant information at all relevant levels of abstraction.
Whilst emergent behaviour and unpredicted outcomes are the intention in some cases, in 
many other cases, however, the possibility of encountering unexpected behaviour from an ICT 
system is unintended and undesirable. Though the designed or intended ‘emergent’ behaviour 
is interesting and deserves study in the context of emergence theory, it is the unintended, 
undesirable ‘emergent’ behaviour of complex ICT systems that is the focus here. When 
managing a health condition or an emergency situation, for instance, one thing we do not 
need is unexpected, unintended emergent behaviour from the systems we have designed. This 
applies also to any serious ICT application, serious in the sense that undesirable consequences 
and negative impact may follow from malfunction. mHealth systems, like all safety-critical or 
life-critical systems, are serious applications in this sense. They are also (often) complex ICT 
systems. Furthermore, they are likely to become more widespread, more complex and more 
autonomous with time. It is obvious that for reasons of patient and public safety, we need to 
understand how to manage these phenomena in order to build resilient and trustable systems. 
Why is it that software systems, which after all are artefacts of our own creation, which we have 
carefully designed using formal mathematically-based notations, implemented on machines of 
our own making and tested rigorously, can give us nasty surprises by suddenly and apparently 
at random exhibiting unwanted and unexpected behaviour?
The fact is that software systems are some of the most complex artefacts created by humans. 
It is not possible to create a bug-free (non-trivial) program and it is not possible to prove (in 
the general case) that a program is correct. The potential for nasty surprises is very common 
because ‘bugs’ (errors) are ubiquitous in software: the industry average is claimed to be ‘about 
15–50 errors per 1000 lines of delivered code’ (McConnell, 2004) and this holds irrespective 
of which programming language is used.
The question of unintended emergent behaviour of software systems is a well-known problem 
in computer science, and creates a major issue for software (and systems) engineering, namely 
the theoretical problem of verification of correct behaviour of software (and, by implication, 
verification of correct behaviour of (complex) ICT systems). The ‘inconvenient truth’ is that even 
standalone, deterministic, algorithmic systems can misbehave.
We would always like to be able to answer the question ‘Does my (computer) program do what 
it should do (and never what it shouldn't do)?’ in the affirmative. Unfortunately we cannot. To 
rephrase and generalise, the answer to the question ‘Is there a decision procedure that can tell 
me, for any program, if the program is correct?’ is ‘No’, and this assertion is provably correct. 
It is entailed amongst others by the well-known ‘halting problem’, which can be formulated 
informally as: it is provable that there is no decision procedure which can tell me, for any 
program, that the program will terminate for every possible input. The ‘Halting problem’, also 
known as the Church-Turing thesis, is one of many provably unsolvable problems in computer 
science, in this case the problem of undecidability (‘Entscheidungsproblem’ or 'decision 
problem'). The proof was provided in 1936 independently by Church using lambda calculus and 
by Turing using the concept of the Turing Machine (Turing, 1937). Although the name ‘halting 
problem’ came later, the problem itself is older and its origins have been traced back to Leibniz.
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For our purposes, the point to note is that even simple properties of programs such as 
termination cannot be proven in the general case. Although methods for proving correctness 
have been developed (in formal verification mathematics and formal logic are used to prove 
certain pre-stated desirable properties of a program), and can be successfully applied in 
specific cases, these methods are in many cases not practically applicable. Further, there is 
no guarantee that they will find unknown or unexpected problems. Furthermore, in the general 
case complete proofs of correctness will always be provably impossible, irrespective of how 
powerful our computers (used in this case as proof engines) may become in future. The reality 
is that most real programs cannot be formally verified in a reasonable time frame, and some 
specific programs can provably never be formally verified (for example by exhaustive testing or 
by proofs of correctness) for a number of reasons, one of which is that in some cases the search 
space is infinite. But the Church-Turing thesis tells us that in the general case there can be no 
oracle on program correctness, because there can be no oracle on program termination. These 
observations lead us to note a distinction between the nature of the propositions. The statement 
above: ‘methods for proving correctness … are in some cases not practically applicable’ relates 
to a contingent truth. The implication is that in future, given sufficient time and increases in 
computing power, individual members of this class of proof problem could change from being 
intractable to being tractable. The halting problem on the other hand appears to be a universal 
truth (it can be proved in principle that no decision procedure which acts as a generic oracle 
on program termination can exist, because it entails a logical contradiction). This can never be 
solved by throwing more computing power at the problem. Instead software engineering relies 
on best effort attempts at attaining higher levels of confidence in the quality of developed 
software through application of systematic development methods including rigorous testing.
Even standalone programs (programs running on a single computer) do not execute in a vacuum; 
they run on top of many layers of system software which mediates between the high level software 
and the lowest levels of code, which interact directly with the hardware which executes the 
program. The complexity of overall system behaviour increases further and by orders of magnitude 
when we consider distributed systems. In a distributed system a program runs in parallel across 
multiple, possibly remote, nodes of a computer network. In this case the (distributed) system 
is also subject to the vagaries of the networking environment, including failure of links, routing 
protocols which send data by different routes in an apparently ad hoc manner (actually it is 
deterministic at some level) and variable transmission delays which together introduce a new 
class of problems relating to timing: ‘concurrency’ problems. Behaviour of networks becomes 
predictable only in probabilistic terms; indeed vendors’ technical specifications and service 
providers’ service level agreements (SLAs) for performance of networks and computer systems 
are expressed in statistical measures relating to failure rates, such as mean time between 
failures (MTBF), availability (the proportion of time a system is expected to be operational) and 
reliability (the probability that a system will produce correct outputs within some given time 
frame).
The sheer complexity of today’s networks in terms of numbers of nodes and hence potential 
numbers of connections between nodes, plus the increasing numbers and diversity of devices 
which are directly or indirectly connected, only exacerbates the problem. Systems which test 
valid in the lab become embroiled in complex webs of interconnected devices when released 
into the wild and system failure is often the result.
A report commissioned by ENISA (European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security) found, amongst others, that database interoperability and device interoperability are 
key priorities for research on current and emerging network technologies. The report comments 
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on sensor networks, key users of which are police, immigration, security services and emergency 
services, as follows:
Many sensor network systems are procured specifically for a given purpose and devices 
are tested systematically to verify that the real effects of their operation in the system 
comply with the stated purpose and other requirements of the purchaser. This verification 
applies up to the instant at which the system is turned over to the customer; and even 
then, what works in a development laboratory or test site may not continue to work when a 
customer installs personal devices alongside the system’s devices. After that, the system 
may evolve in many ways and one outcome is that additional or replacement devices 
compromise its function. This problem is a major headache for appliance manufacturers 
in home and building systems and in healthcare (Gorniak, 2010).
Note particularly the observation that once the system is in use and exposed to a complex 
networking environment ‘the system may evolve in many ways and one outcome is that additional 
or replacement devices compromise its function’ [my italics]. The report contains a detailed 
analysis of this and other risks and vulnerabilities with guidelines for design choices to mitigate 
the effects. In general, in fact, mitigation is the best that we can expect in terms of remedy for 
the behavioural problems of complex ICT systems.
Computer scientists and engineers have developed analysis and design and development 
methods for aiming for the highest (software) quality possible in the circumstances. These 
methods include systematic design and development methodologies and tools, (partial) 
verification approaches such as formal testing, work on quality of data and quality of service 
and work on reliability and dependability of systems. Industry adopts (usually with a lag time 
of the order of years) (some of these) approaches. But the fact is that no method can guarantee 
correct operation in all circumstances, so strategies for managing and ring-fencing possible 
problems that may arise need to be included at the design stage.
Given that (unintended) emergent behaviour of complex systems is a major problem for mHealth 
systems in general and the emergency setting in particular, can we get some purchase on 
this problem, or at least some further insight, by examining the issues in terms of emergence 
theory and consideration of which kind of emergence we are dealing with in relation to complex 
behaviour of ICT systems?
Some Observations on Emergence
Disasters and emergencies, whether they originate in and/or impact on physical reality or cyber space (or both), often occur suddenly and apparently without warning, in other words 
they seem to emerge unexpectedly and from nowhere. Herein lies one connection between 
emergence and emergency. When phenomena are unplanned and unexpected and (for now) 
appear to be inexplicable (and especially if they are disruptive) there is a temptation to see them 
as emergent. One explanation in some cases is given by catastrophe theory, which describes 
a class of events which are caused by gradual incremental change in some variable or set of 
variables which, when a critical value or state is reached, may trigger some catastrophic event. 
Imagine an off-road vehicle ascending a mountain side, where the inclination of the slope is 
increasing gradually with altitude. As the angle of inclination continues to increase, at a certain 
point the vehicle will suddenly overbalance and fall backwards into the abyss below, because 
the point has been reached where the position of the centre of gravity of the vehicle relative 
to the ground supporting it has passed beyond a critical value. The increase in the angle of 
inclination was continuous, no quantum leaps were involved in the changing value of that 
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variable, but a tipping point, literally and metaphorically, has been reached, with sudden and 
dramatic consequences. (You may wish to try this at home, but only with a Dinky toy.)
Anderson describes two different ways of thinking about emergency: ‘the sudden irruption that 
emerges from within life without warning […] and the incubating disaster that is already ongoing 
beneath awareness. […] Terrorism being the paradigmatic example of the first type of event, and 
climate change being the paradigmatic example of the second’ (Anderson, 2012).
Is the fall of the off-roader a sudden irruption or an incubating disaster? It appears at first sight 
to be both at once. On the one hand, there is no warning to the driver of the imminent fall, on 
the other hand, the physical principles involved are well understood, and the event could have 
been predicted on the basis of theory together with the pertinent data. We need to consider this 
question: ‘sudden irruption or incubating disaster?’ in relation to emergencies of all kinds, if 
only because if emergencies can be predicted we can prepare for them or perhaps avert them. If 
we look at the notions of weak and strong emergence of Chalmers, we may get more leverage on 
this question. Chalmers distinguishes two different concepts of emergence: strong emergence 
and weak emergence, characterising strong emergence thus:
We can say that a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a low-level 
domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths 
concerning that phenomenon are not deducible even in principle from truths in the low-
level domain (2006).
and associating this interpretation with philosophical debate on emergence dating from the 
1920s. In contrast he identifies the concept of weak emergence with more recent debate from 
the scientific community, characterising it thus:
We can say that a high-level phenomenon is weakly emergent with respect to a low-level 
domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths 
concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing the low-level 
domain (2006).
One consequence of this distinction between strong versus weak emergence seems to be that 
strongly emergent phenomena cannot ever be predicted from knowledge of the lower levels 
because there can be no complete reductionist explanation. For weakly emergent phenomena 
explanation (and therefore prediction) may be difficult, but the possibility exists; this then 
becomes a question of knowledge and knowability. In other words the predictability problem 
reduces to an epistemological question. Do we have an adequate understanding or model of 
the underlying processes? Do we have (or can we access) all the relevant data? If the answer 
to either of these questions is No, then prediction is not possible, now, for pragmatic reasons 
but may become possible in the future. If the answer to both of these questions is Yes, 
then prediction is possible, if we can afford it and if there is sufficient time. Yesterday we 
worshipped the mountain, but today we finally understood vulcanology, so tomorrow we will 
use seismography to detect and predict eruptions. This contrast between unpredictability and 
possibility of prediction (though possibly intractable at present) is reminiscent of the contrast 
between provably unsolvable problems versus the merely intractable problems (intractable at a 
given point in time) of computer science.
Chalmers poses the question, 'Are there any strongly emergent phenomena?'. He concludes 
that there are, but can find only one candidate: consciousness. In a small way I searched for 
examples of strongly emergent phenomena, starting by looking for classificatory dimension such 
as emergent behaviour in natural systems (such as insect colonies, weather events, natural 
disasters, virology, epidemiology), emergent behaviour in artificial systems (e.g. artificial life), 
human and social phenomena (e.g. man-made disasters, crime, terrorism), natural language 
(emergence of spoken language as a natural and ubiquitous process in contrast to the human 
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artefact of written language) and in artificial or formal languages (e.g. computer programming 
languages, language of mathematics).
Some possible dimensions for consideration were identified: whether the phenomena are 
natural or man-made (evolved or designed); intended or unintended (planned or unplanned); 
predictable or not (expected or unexpected); the degree of predictability (probabilistic and fuzzy 
systems, uncertainty, non-determinism); and whether they are benign or malign (desirable or 
undesirable). The last refers to the observation that perhaps we pay more attention to those 
events which rate higher according to some function of the seriousness, to us, of their impact 
on things which concern us. Applying these concepts I found several phenomena that on 
examination seemed to be weakly emergent. It is now known that swarm behaviour, as exhibited 
by flocking birds and some species of fish shoals for example, can be described in some cases 
by very simple rule sets, such that computer programs can easily be written which emulate 
(at any rate the appearance of) the complex behaviour patterns. Regarding predictability of 
emergencies, we could argue that if we knew all about all the underlying mechanisms and 
contributing factors (including the human psychosocial elements) (that is, if we had a kind of 
omniscient Health and Safety Executive (HSE)) emergencies would be predictable. Indeed post-
hoc analyses of air accidents, fires, road accidents, nuclear accidents (e.g. Three Mile Island) 
and fatal accidents involving medical equipment (e.g. Therac 25) seem to provide compelling 
and apparently comprehensive analyses of the contributory factors and evolution of complex 
emergencies; this seems to suggest that in principle these incidents could have been predicted. 
Natural disasters and extreme weather events are sometimes predictable, but not always reliably. 
Some of our models have strong predictive power (especially in the short term) but performance 
tends to decrease when we peer further into the future. Models are usually simplifications, often 
probabilistic, and ‘noise’ or error can overwhelm ‘signal’ the further ahead we look. As chaos 
theory shows, small initial effects can be amplified with time and space and move from having 
negligible to overwhelming impact on accuracy and reliability of results.
Finally, is emergent behaviour in complex ICT systems a case of weak or strong emergence? 
And what are the consequences for design of ICT systems, and planning for and managing ICT 
disasters?
There is no theoretical limit on the complexity of the computational models (or computer 
programs) that we can create (though in real life there will be practical constraints contingent 
on the particularities of any real computing environment). This holds not only for the informal 
everyday understanding of complexity, but also in terms of the formal mathematical definitions 
of computational complexity and network complexity. Might emergent behaviour of complex 
systems in general, and complex ICT systems in particular, qualify as a candidate for strong 
emergence? Or do we simply face everyday weak emergence problems with ICT systems, some of 
which may seem intractable, but with effort and technological advances may become tractable? 
This hope fades somewhat when we remind ourselves that the theoretical impossibility of 
complete verification of ICT systems in the general case is proven for all time. This means 
that the best we can ever hope for is best effort quality assurance through testing, with no 
guarantee that all errors will be exposed.
Conclusions and Discussion
Computer software, which has been called the most complex human artefact we know, is embedded in complex ICT systems, which in turn are embedded in the larger and even 
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more complex socio-technical context of human organisations, procedures, operators and users 
within the built and natural environment. Our ICT systems increasingly pervade the physical 
and natural environment from aerospace down to nano-scale and beyond; we have instrumented 
space, the oceans, the earth, our homes, workplaces, vehicles, possessions, our animals and 
our own bodies.
Our future mHealth systems will be complex distributed ICT systems which are likely to use and 
interact with emergent ICT and biomedical technologies including smart environments, smart 
implants, smart drugs, intra-body networks and bionanotechnology.
Furthermore, the complexity of computer systems, communications networks and the amount 
of data to be transferred and processed is about to increase massively due to several factors. 
More and more embedded sensor networks generate more and more high volume data (the ‘big 
data’ issue). Network complexity of the Internet will increase by orders of magnitude with IPV6. 
The current IPV4 (the Internet protocol which underlies all Internet communications) has an 
address space of 232 (meaning that about 4.3 billion devices could be connected to the Internet 
at any one time). Incredibly, this address space is running out. To cater for future needs, IPV4 
is in the process of being replaced by IPV6, with an address space of 2128 (allowing about 340 
trillion, trillion, trillion devices to be connected simultaneously). This enables an explosive 
increase in the complexity of Internet topology, in terms of number of nodes and the increase 
in the potential number of interconnections between nodes. IPV6 thus enables realisation of 
the Internet of Things (IoT) where any number of everyday objects can have their own Internet 
address and communicate directly with each other, and can also be directly addressed and even 
controlled by other nodes. For body area networks, for example, this means that every person 
and animal in the world could have a sophisticated BAN equipped with innumerable sensors 
and other devices, each of which could be directly addressable instead of communicating via a 
platform such as a smartphone.
We can imagine a future disappearing BAN enabled (in the short term) by wearable electronics 
and contactless sensing; in the medium term by implants and in-body wireless communications. 
Farther into the future we can envisage in-body nano-level sensing, data communications and 
processing based on cutting-edge research in (bio)nanotechnologies. These developments could 
enable routine care for large sections of the population where individuals are equipped with 
nanoBANs, each of which monitors the individual’s health condition(s) and delivers personalised 
treatment interventions as well as monitoring at the cellular level within the body.
At the same time there will be more and more pressure for future mHealth systems to provide 
semi-autonomous or autonomous services. So the question of how to quality assure future 
eHealth and mhealth systems and ensure patient safety in face of the fact that complex ICT 
systems can exhibit (unintended) emergent behaviour is a crucial one.
The tentative conclusion is that emergencies are emergent phenomena, but probably weakly 
emergent. ICT systems are both part of the solution and part of the problem. ICT systems 
themselves, which are now part of the critical infrastructure, carry their own risks and vulnerabilities 
in emergency response and sometimes exhibit emergent behaviour. We have not succeeded 
in proving that emergent behaviour in complex ICT systems is a case of strong emergence, 
however even weakly emergent behaviour poses great challenges. Reductionist explanations, 
and therefore prediction, seem theoretically possible; however prediction nevertheless seems to 
be made intractable by the inherent complexity of the systems we have created. That complexity 
is set to increase explosively for the foreseeable future. In any case, the theoretical impossibility 
of complete verification of ICT systems in the general case is proven for all time. This means 
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that the best we can ever hope for is best effort quality assurance through testing, with no 
guarantee that all errors will be exposed. This fact is well known in computer science circles, 
but its implications need to be understood by society at large.
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